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Abstract 
This paper is devoted to a complex set of issues relating to the functions of tort law 
in distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable risks. Often, such risks are brought 
about by deliberate organisational design choice. On many occasions, legislators 
and courts are called upon to assess which of these design choices are acceptable 
and which are not. 
By evaluating a number of recent legislative drafts and proposals I present an out-
line of what seems to be becoming a standard of „organisational liability‟ for organ-
isational failure. Moreover, I put forward a threefold typology of risks in tort law 
which seems to go a long way in categorizing tort law cases involving organisa-
tional design risks. Finally, I call the reader‟s attention to the fact that tort law is in 
need of rational recalibration with regard to the „ranking of risks‟, as it seems that 
some risks are inconsistently categorized as either acceptable or unacceptable.  
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1. ‘Organisational design’ and European tort law 
 
[119] Although the causative patterns of accidental deaths and injuries 
vary, in tort law the classical approach is to think of accidents as either the 
consequence of unfortunate hazard for which no one can be held responsi-
ble or the result of incidental moments of human negligence and momen-
tary lapse of concentration for which tort law attributes responsibility.  And 
indeed, some accidents for which tortious liability offers relief – such as traf-
fic accidents – can usually be traced back to such individual errors.  
 
However, if we look at personal injury litigation exclusively from this angle – 
injury being the result of chance events with an unfortunate and often unin-
tended adverse outcome for which the law merely ascribes ex post respon-
sibility – we are denied another view of this field. This alternative view on 
„organisational design‟ is central to this paper. 
 
Injury may well be the outcome of what I will refer to as „organisational de-
sign‟. The concept of „organisational design‟ refers to the processes, proto-
cols, and procedures governing businesses, corporations, governments, 
agencies and other formal groups. From this angle, accidents may well be 
the avoidable consequence of flawed organisational design and assigning 
liability for death and injury thus becomes a judicial appraisal of „organisa-
tional design‟. The negligent act of a nurse mistaking a used syringe for a 
clean one then is not so much the wrongful act of an individual but rather 
the wrongful omission of the hospital employing the nurse to install and en-
force a specific safety procedure averting such mistakes. In this view, or-
ganisational design is at the heart of the accident causation. 
 
Flawed organisational design is and should be subject to liability of the or-
ganisation. In tort law, there are many instances in which courts are called 
upon to evaluate organisational design. In cases where national courts 
consider organisations negligent in taking precautionary measures to avoid 
injury – ranging from slipping and tripping accidents to negligent exposure 
of employees to toxic substances – we can conclude that the organisational 
design at hand failed. Likewise, in strict liability for defective products one 
can derive from the „reasonable consumer safety expectations‟ test under 
the 1985 Products Liability Directive1 that a flawed product design or warn-
                                               
 
1
 Article 6 Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products, as amended by Directive 1999/34/EC. Cf. art. 3 (3) (f) Directive 2001/95/EC of 3 
December 2001 on general product safety. 
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ing defect has serious implications for the design of the manufacturer‟s or-
ganisation itself. 
 
In practice, the legal framework for evaluation of „organisational design‟ 
may differ considerably. Fault-based liability and strict liability may be con-
sidered as very dissimilar in detail, but when it comes to organisational de-
sign such liabilities do seem to have a shared focal point: the organisational 
design [120] may be declared defective in the sense that it is deemed un-
acceptably unsafe (it failed) and hence a source of tortious liability.  
 
In this paper I will address some issues relating to organisational design. I 
will do so by analysing a number of recent legislative initiatives in Europe. 
These include the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL; drafted by the 
European Group on Tort Law), the French pre-proposal Catala (Avant pro-
jet Catala), the Austrian Draft (Entwurf Koziol c.s.), the Swiss pre-proposal 
(Vorentwurf Widmer/Wessner) and the Turkish Draft (Türk Borçlar Kanunu 
Tasarisi).2  
 
These drafts and proposals are representative of the current approach to 
tort liability in Europe‟s tort law systems and may therefore be prototypical 
for future harmonization efforts in this field.3 Moreover, these legislative ini-
tiatives have several remarkable features concerning organisational design 
and its failure. Firstly, some of these initiatives consider employer's liability 
for wrongful behaviour by employees to be a strict liability rather than a 
fault-based liability. Indeed, although traditionally individual failure within 
organisations is considered to be a motive for imposing some semi fault-
based vicarious liability on employers (either on the basis of „culpa in eli-
gendo‟ or some presumed failure to instruct and supervise),4 both the PETL 
and the Projet Catala tend towards introducing pure and simple strict liabil-
ity of the employing organisation for individual failure of employees.5  
Secondly, and more fundamental is the acknowledgement in these legisla-
tive initiatives that individuals are part of an organisation and that such or-
ganisations owe them and others a duty to carefully contemplate the design 
of the organisation and its activities. For instance, with regard to profes-
                                               
 
2
 See generally B. A. Koch, 'The "Principles of European Tort Law"', 8 ERA Forum 2007, 
107 ff.; Pierre Catala (ed.), Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescrip-
tion (2006) 1 ff. ; Irmgard Griss et al. (ed.), Entwurf eines neuen österreichischen Schaden-
ersatzrechts (2006) 1 ff.; Erdem Büyüksagis, 'Die Haftung aus unerlaubter Handlung im 
Entwurf eines neuen türkischen Obligationenrechts', Haftung und Versicherung (HAVE) 
2006, 330 ff.  
3
 I will not address the need and feasibility of such harmonization at a European level. 
4
 The Austrian proposal puts the burden of disproving fault and “culpa in eligendo” on the 
professional employer (art. 1306), as do the Swiss and Turkish Drafts.   
5
  Art. 6:102 PETL (Liability for auxiliaries); art. 1359 Projet Catala. The French proposal 
even renders the employee a secondary liable person (art. 1359 (2) Projet Catala), which I 
feel is very logical.  
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sionals we can see that a special „level of liability‟ is sometimes designed 
for organisational failure. Article 65 (3) of the Turkish proposal states:  
 
„He who employs someone in the course of his business, is obliged to 
compensate the damage that is caused to the employee in the opera-
tion of the business activities unless he can prove that the organisa-
tion is capable of preventing such damage from occurring.”  
 
[121] Moreover, specific duties to avoid organisational design failure can be 
found in both the Swiss („Organisation der Unternehmung‟; art. 49a), the 
French („defaut d‟organisation‟; art. 1353) and the Austrian proposals 
(„Mangel im Unternehmen‟; art. 1304) and under the PETL („Enterprise li-
ability‟; art. 4:202).6  
Although it is doubtful that these prospective liabilities are very different 
from the actual current court practice under general rules of negligence, 
they do have a clear symbolic value. They underscore the central role that 
professional organisations play in society in both reducing accident risks 
and spreading personal injury losses. As such, these provisions signal that 
organisations are judged according to a higher standard of care and pre-
caution than is applied to individuals‟ acts. Note for instance that the Projet 
Catala explicitly expands the notion of wrongful behaviour from purely indi-
vidual wrongdoing to „organisational failure‟: 
 
La faute de la personne morale s’entend non seulement de celle qui 
est commise par un représentant, mais aussi de celle qui résulte d’un 
défaut d’organisation ou de fonctionnement. [art. 1353 Projet Catala; 
Wrongful conduct of a legal person is not restricted to conduct of a 
legal representative, but also includes conduct resulting from organ-
isational negligence and actions] 
 
Naturally, legal systems have their own way of dealing with corporate 
wrongdoing, but nevertheless it is interesting to see that the French pro-
posal moves away from individual error and puts the emphasis on what 
went wrong in the organisation. Framing organisations in terms of aggre-
gates of individuals makes it possible to attribute certain wrongful organisa-
tional conditions – ranging from working conditions to supervision of prod-
uct chains, and fatal omissions within hospitals – to the organisation rather 
than the individual. Note that the Austrian Draft has a specific provision 
dealing with liability for organisational design: 
                                               
 
6
 Generally on enterprise liability Kai Wantzen, Unternehmenshaftung und Enterprise Liabili-
ty (Tübingen 2007) 1 ff., in particular p. 43 ff. Cf. the American perspective put forward by 
George L. Priest, 'The invention of enterprise liability: a critical history of the intellectual 
foundations of modern tort law', XIV J. Legal Stud. 1985, 461 ff. 
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§ 1304. (1) Wer aus wirtschaftlichen oder beruflichen Interessen ein 
Unternehmen betreibt, haftet auch für den durch einen Mangel im 
Unternehmen, seiner Erzeugnisse und Dienstleistungen verursachten 
Schaden. Der Unternehmer haftet nicht, wenn er beweist, dass die 
zur Abwendung des Schadens erforderliche Sorgfalt aufgewendet 
wurde.  
(2) Mangel ist jede Abweichung von dem Standard, der nach der 
Darbietung, dem Stand von Wissenschaft und Technik sowie den 
Verkehrsgewohnheiten beim Unternehmen, seinen Erzeugnissen und 
Dienstleistungen erwartet werden darf. 
(3) (…)  
 
[122] A similar approach is taken in article 4:202 PETL („Enterprise Liabil-
ity‟), which provides: 
 
(1) A person pursuing a lasting enterprise for economic or profes-
sional purposes who uses auxiliaries or technical equipment is liable 
for any harm caused by a defect of such enterprise or of its output 
unless he proves that he has conformed to the required standard of 
conduct. 
(2) „Defect” is any deviation from standards that are reasonably to be 
expected from the enterprise or from its products or services. 
 
In essence, these drafts provide an extra-contractual fault-based liability for 
defective products and professional services with a reversal of the burden 
of proof in respect of – what I would consider – conformity of the organisa-
tional design with objective expectancies. Such a fault-based liability in part 
fulfils a similar function as a strict liability would in the sense that the burden 
of proving force majeure and development risk are on the liable organisa-
tion. 
 
Hereafter, we will see further examples of how the above-mentioned drafts 
and proposals deal with matters of organisational design. Special attention 
is given to so-called enterprise liability (cf. art. 4:202 PETL) and the liability 
for inherent risks of dangerous activities. This latter category of liability is to 
be found, e.g., in art. 5:101 PETL („Abnormally dangerous activities‟): 
 
 (1) A person who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is 
strictly liable for damage characteristic to the risk presented by the 
activity and resulting from it. 
(2) An activity is abnormally dangerous if 
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a)  it creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of damage even 
when all due care is exercised in its management and 
b)  it is not a matter of common usage. 
(3) A risk of damage may be significant having regard to the serious-
ness or the likelihood of the damage. 
(4) (…) 
 
 
2. Three types of risk in tort law 
 
Obviously, the creation of danger is an important starting point for assigning 
liability, either in combination with some level of negligence, defectiveness 
of an object or even merely the inherent danger of an activity itself. It 
seems [123] that in this respect the abovementioned legislative initiatives 
distinguish – at least on a theoretical level –three patterns:7  
 
1. Injuries which are left uncompensated and which originate from the in-
herent risks of legal activities. The injured party is considered to be the 
unfortunate victim of „daily‟ or „ubiquitous‟ risks, or his own free choice. 
From the outset others are not considered to bear responsibility, even 
though they may well be responsible (in part) for creating the risk at 
hand. One can  for example have in mind a national inoculation pro-
gram which saves many lives but which also causes a lethal allergic re-
action among a fraction of the persons that are treated. Other examples 
include nuisance that does not surpass the level of unacceptability.  
2. Injuries which are compensated through the tort law system by assign-
ing liability for the inherent dangers of a perfectly acceptable organisa-
tional design. In such cases, the policy choice by legislature or court to 
grant compensation although the design itself is deemed acceptable 
may be based on the idea that the benefits of reducing the risk level by 
improving the organisational design measured in saved living years do 
not outweigh the cost thereof (provided such improvement is possible 
anyway). Compensation the so-called „residual losses‟ is deemed ap-
propriate. 8 In the inoculation scheme example, a legislative compensa-
                                               
 
7
 For a similar analysis, see Israel Gilead, 'On the justifications of strict liability', in: H. Koziol 
and Barbara C. Steininger (ed.), European Tort Law 2004 (Tort and Insurance Law Year-
book) (Vienna 2005) 28 ff. 
8
 This is what the German Legal doctrine refers to as „Residualschäden‟. For a clear analy-
sis, see Gerhard Wagner, 'Grundstrukturen des Europäischen Deliktsrechts', in: Reinhard 
Zimmermann (ed.), Grundstrukturen des Europäischen Deliktsrechts (Baden-Baden 2003) 
271 ff. Cf. Erdem Büyüksagis, 'De l'opportunité de préciser la portée d'une éventuelle clause 
générale de responsabilité pour risque', Haftung und Versicherung (HAVE) 2006, 2. For a 
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tion scheme – be it in the form of a strict liability for the inherent risks of 
the scheme or in any other form – may well be the result of such bal-
ancing of cost and benefits. 
3. Injuries which are compensated through the tort system because they 
were the result of irresponsible omission to take precautionary meas-
ures by the person responsible for the source of danger (owners, users, 
operators, et cetera). This is the area where tort law compensates for 
reasons of negligence. Note that under continental legal systems, cases 
that fall under this category may well be subject to a strict liability where 
such liability attaches to a defective state of objects (products!), activi-
ties, et cetera.9 
 
[124] At this abstract level, dangers from organisational design can be 
qualified as either acceptable (nos. 1 and 2) or unacceptable (no. 3). Al-
though in both categories 2 and 3 both the injured party is compensated, 
the legal justification for such compensation seems to differ considerably. It 
must be admitted, however, that the line between categories 2 and 3 may 
be a thin line. Traffic accidents for instance are the price that society is will-
ing to pay for mobility and economic growth. This may a rationale for intro-
ducing a strict liability for traffic accidents caused by motor vehicles, but this 
rationale may also be transposed by courts into a semi-strict liability based 
on the fault principle.10 Indeed, in concrete cases traffic accidents are usu-
ally the result of momentary inadvertence and loss of concentration. There-
fore, much depends on how we look upon the risks of motorized traffic: the 
aggregate of individual wrongful behaviour or the price that society has to 
pay for aggregate individual loss.11 
The same seems to be true for other risks. The risk of nuclear energy 
plants is covered by international treaties imposing a form of limited strict 
liability on operators. The rationale for this liability obviously is the inherent 
risk of nuclear catastrophe (which would place such liability in category 2) 
but in concrete cases there may well be an organisational failure at the 
heart of the chain of events leading to the accident (which would place the 
foundation for liability in category 3). Similar considerations apply to ski lifts 
that catch fire (Caprun) and fertilizer manufacturing plants that explode 
(Atofina Toulouse).  
 
                                                                                                                       
 
further theoretical underpinning, see, e.g., Jozef Esser, Grundlagen und Entwicklung der 
Gefährdungshaftung (München 1941/1969) 69 ff. 
9
 On the grey areas between fault-based liability and strict liability, see, e.g.,  Cees van Dam, 
European Tort Law (Oxford 2006) 113 ff.; T. Hartlief, 'De aansprakelijkheid voor zaken', in: 
M.E. Franke and e.a. (ed.), Onrechtmatige daad (BWKJ 12) (Deventer 1996)  201 ff. 
10
 See, e.g., Nils Jansen, 'The State of the Art of European Tort Law', in: Mauro Bussani 
(ed.), European Tort Law - Eastern and Western Perspectives (Berne 2007) 22 ff. 
11
 Cf. G. Schamps, La Mise en Danger: un Concept Fondateur d'un Principe Général de 
Responsabilité (Bruxelles 1998) 881-882. 
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So theoretically it might well be feasible to discern category 2 from 3. Art. 
5:101 PETL does so by assigning liability for foreseeable and highly signifi-
cant risks which can materialize „even when all due care is exercised in its 
management‟. In reality however, courts decide what the level of due care 
is and they thus decide where to draw the line between acceptable and un-
acceptable risks.12 Moreover, if complainants cannot bring convincing evi-
dence of the cause of the accident, courts may be unable to offer compen-
sation if there is no strict liability available that can be applied. This may 
indeed be a further practical reason for imposing strict liability without clari-
fying the category it exactly covers. 
 
[125] We can conclude that there may be grey areas between categories 2 
and 3,13 but as such, the division into three categories still seems to be 
helpful in finding the theoretical foundation of liability for risks in tort law. 
This raises the question whether tort law systems should not try to distin-
guish more clearly between categories 1, 2 and 3. I feel this issue deserves 
some consideration.  
For instance, when courts are called upon to apply strict liability for defec-
tive products, it has to assess design safety. Let‟s assume for instance that 
a particular new design which is applied in a brand of children bicycles 
brings users a 20% increase in accident risk compared to other designs. A 
court may be called to judge whether this is an „acceptably dangerous de-
sign‟ (which probably files the bicycle under category 1) or an „unaccept-
able dangerous design‟ (which would file the bicycle design under category 
3). 
I feel that by trying to categorize the risks formed by organisational designs 
that are deemed acceptable to society and by distinguishing these from un-
acceptable organisational design failure, we could achieve a better under-
standing of the true reasons for both compensating victims and withholding 
compensation.  
 
3. Liability for inherent risks of acceptable organisational design 
 
Finding the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable organisa-
tional design risk was considered to be a legislative task in as early as the 
mid and late 1800s. In this era some European jurisdictions considered the 
                                               
 
12
 See also art. 1362 Projet Catala which refers to activities „meme licite‟ (activities allowed 
under public law regulation), art. 50 Swiss Proposal ( „selbst wenn es sich um eine von der 
Rechtsordnung geduldete Tätigkeit handelt‟, referring to the legality of the underlying activi-
ty), § 1302  Austrian Draft („trotz Aufwendung der erforderlichen Sorgfalt‟, which hints at a 
normative standard of conduct which may surpass public standards. 
13
 Cf. G. Schamps, La Mise en Danger: un Concept Fondateur d'un Principe Général de 
Responsabilité (Bruxelles 1998) 860 who seems not to object against mixing category 2 and 
3 cases as this improves the position of those suffering from injuries. 
 
 
 
   
10 
risks of newly invented Victorian machinery – steam boilers and engines – 
to be of an irrefutable but nonetheless acceptable nature. The legislative or 
judicial issue was merely whether there should be compensation for such 
inherent risks. Courts commonly adhered to a strict idea of corporate re-
sponsibility under fault-based liability (category 3 cases), leaving legisla-
tures the task of devising statutory regimes for category 2 injuries. And 
some legislatures indeed rose to the occasion. Active legislators were to be 
found in German, Austrian and Swiss law, who created strict liability for 
such sources of increased danger in specific legislation („Sondergesetze‟).14 
The French legislature was less active (if we exclude the exceptional Loi 
Badinter 1985 concerning motor vehicle accidents),15 but this was compen-
sated by a very extensive judicial interpretation of art. 1384 al. 1er  Code 
Civil („fait des choses‟).16 In England and Wales both [126] the legislature 
and the courts refused to introduce a general strict liability for sources of 
increased danger beyond the restrictive rule in Rylands v Fletcher.17 
The current legislative initiatives seem to choose a so-called general clause 
(„Generalklausel‟), i.e., a general standard for strict liability rather than well 
defined and readily applicable rules of strict liability. Such a „general clause‟ 
pertaining to strict liability for dangerous activities is currently only in force 
in Italy and Portugal (although in those jurisdictions this liability seems to be 
a fault-based liability with a reversal of the burden of proof).18 
 
4. How rational is tort law in comparing risks? 
 
In this section I will look with some detail into the legislative drafts under 
consideration and how they compare and categorize risks. For example, 
art. 5:101 PETL assigns strict liability for the inherent risks of „abnormally 
dangerous activities‟ that create a „foreseeable and highly significant risk of 
                                               
 
14
 Cf. Chr. v. Bar, Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht Bd. II (München 1999) 366 ff. 
15
 Other examples of strict liability under French law are to be found at Pierre Catala (ed.), 
Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription (2006) 161 fn. 1. 
16
 Note that the concept of faits des choses does not only covers acceptable inherent risks 
but also the unacceptable defective state of the object. 
17
 Rylands v Fletcher [1868 ] 3 L.R. 330. For an overview, see Konrad Zweigert and Hein 
Kötz, An introduction to comparative law (Oxford 1998) 646 ff.;  G. Schamps, La Mise en 
Danger: un Concept Fondateur d'un Principe Général de Responsabilité (Bruxelles 1998) 1 
ff. Further references to be found at W.H. van Boom, 'Some remarks on the Decline of Ryl-
ands v Fletcher and the Disparity of European Strict Liability Regimes', ZEuP 2005, 618 ff. 
18
 See art. 493 (2) Código Civil Portuguĕs (“Quem causar danos a outrem no exercício de 
uma actividade, perigosa por sua própria natureza ou pela natureza dos meios utilizados, é 
obrigado a repará-los, excepto se mostrar que empregou todas as providências exigidas 
pelas circunstâncias com o fim de os prevenir.”); art. 2050 Codice Civile („Responsabilità per 
l'esercizio di attività pericolose‟, dat bepaalt: “Chiunque cagiona danno ad altri nello 
svolgimento di un'attività pericolosa, per sua natura o per la natura dei mezzi adoperati, e 
tenuto al risarcimento, se non prova di avere adottato tutte le misure idonee a evitare il 
danno.”). Cf. Chr. v. Bar, Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht Bd. II (München 1999) 374. 
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damage‟. Likewise, the other initiatives refer to activities with „potentialité 
remarquable‟, which are „likely to do mischief‟, and which pose a level of 
danger which is „bijzonder‟, „qualifié‟, „specifique‟ „hoher‟, „erhöhter‟. These 
qualifications are all expressions of a certain level of risk that acts as a 
threshold for liability.19  
Especially sophisticated is the theory behind the Austrian Draft, which dis-
tinguishes between strict liability for sources of high danger (“Quellen hoher 
Gefahr”) and fault-based liability with a reversal of burden of proof with re-
gard to sources of increased danger (“Quellen erhöhter Gefahr”). The Draft 
thus categorizes: [127] 
 
Quellen hoher Gefahr (§ 1302) Quellen erhöhter Gefahr (§ 1303) 
 
Eine Quelle hoher Gefahr liegt vor, wenn eine 
Sache als solche, ihr gewöhnlicher Gebrauch 
oder eine Tätigkeit trotz Aufwendung der er-
forderlichen Sorgfalt das Risiko häufiger oder 
schwerer Schäden mit sich bringt. Quellen 
hoher Gefahr sind insbesondere Kernanlagen, 
Staudamme, Öl-, Gas- und Starkstromleitun-
gen, Munitionsfabriken und -lager, ferner Luft-
fahrzeuge, Eisen- und Seilbahnen, Motorfahr-
zeuge und Motorboote sowie Bergbau und 
Sprengungen. 
 
[There is a source of high danger if an object 
as such, its common use or an activity – even 
if performed with the necessary carefulness – 
causes a risk of frequent or serious. Sources 
of high danger are in particular nuclear plants, 
dams, oil, gas and high voltage cables and 
conduits, munitions factories and warehouses, 
as well as airplanes, railways, ski lifts, motor 
vehicles and motor boats and mining and 
blasting] 
 
Eine erhöhte Gefahr kann insbe-
sondere durch Tiere, Bauwerke, 
Motorfahrzeuge mit niedriger 
Höchstgeschwindigkeit oder 
Tätigkeiten wie Rad- und Schi-
fahren mit höherer Geschwindig-
keit hervorgerufen werden. 
 
[An increased danger can be 
caused in particular by animals, 
building sites, motor vehicles with 
low maximum speed as well as 
by bicycling and skiing with high 
speed] 
 
The risk categorization introduced by the Austrian draft, raises the question 
whether it has filed the right cases under the right category. Would a build-
ing site really be less dangerous than a railway enterprise? Builders are 
more at risk of suffering accidents at work than railway employees are. 
Given the statistical odds of injuries involving railways and injuries sus-
tained in the construction industry, it seems difficult to maintain that rail-
                                               
 
19
 Cf. G. Schamps, La Mise en Danger: un Concept Fondateur d'un Principe Général de 
Responsabilité (Bruxelles 1998) 862 ff. 
 
 
 
   
12 
ways are the source of high danger and „Bauwerke‟ merely a source of „in-
creased danger‟.20  
[128] Moreover, most accidents actually happen inside (finished) buildings. 
In particular, stairways are strongly associated with personal injury.21 If that 
is the case, should we then not focus on buildings in general or staircases 
in particular as sources of high danger? 
The examples show that the task of categorizing risks is indeed a difficult 
task. In fact, this was already illustrated by the „general clause‟ of liability for 
dangerous activities in Portuguese and Italian legal systems. Consider for 
example the list of activities that were and were not deemed dangerous un-
der these legal systems:22 
 
Considered not dangerous Considered dangerous 
o Operating a water conduit
 
o Operating an automated teller ma-
chine
 
o Plastering works 
 
o Operating aircrafts and trains
 
o Trading gas liquids
 
 
o Operating a water conduit (sic!) 
o Manufacturing medicines 
o Storing personal data 
o Hunting 
o Offering horse riding lessons 
o Organising a fire works show 
o (nuisance caused by) the use of a 
drilling hammer 
o Burning garden trash near a main 
road 
o A manufacturing process in which 
environmentally dangerous sub-
stances escape 
 
                                               
 
20
 The EU statistics office Statline data (“Rail transport accidents in the European Union in 
2005-2006”; Eurostat Data in Focus 2008/1) shows that in 2006 in Austria some 43 persons 
(in Europe: 1370 persons) were killed in railway operation (2 passengers, no staff, and 
therefore mostly others, e.g., at level crossings). Statline data also indicate that Austria had 
some 8.8 casualties per 100,000 employed in construction 2006. From an occupational in-
jury point of view, we can say the occupational accident rate in building is generally speak-
ing higher than it is in the transport sector. The number of fatal accidents is, however, rela-
tively similar (discounting for unequal number of persons employed). See, e.g., Factsheet 19 
(2001) “Work-related Accidents in the EU - the Statistical Picture (1998-1999)” by the Euro-
pean Agency for Safety and Health at Work, at 
http://osha.europa.eu/publications/factsheets/19/factsn19-en.pdf/at_download/file.  
21
 Cf. Susan P. Baker and Susan P. Baker, The Injury fact book (New York 1992) 135; John 
Templer, The Staircase - Studies of Hazards, Falls, and Safer Designs (Cambridge 1992) 5  
ff;  W. Kip Viscusi, 'Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety Regulation', 
28  J. Law & Ecs. 1985, 530. Indeed, accident statistics in The Netherlands show that slip-
ping and tripping accidents cause some 2500 fatalities (mainly among the elderly) whereas 
traffic accidents account for a „mere‟ 996 fatalities. See Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 
Vademecum gezondheidsstatistiek Nederland 2003 (Voorburg/Heerlen 2003) 130. 
22
 Examples referred to by Chr. v. Bar, Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht Bd. II (München 
1999) 377-378. See also the meandering case law by the Austrian Oberste Gerichtshof con-
cerning „gefährliche unternehmerische Tätigkeit‟, referred to by Chr. v. Bar, Gemeineuropäi-
sches Deliktsrecht Bd. II (München 1999) 382-383. 
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The examples show that it is difficult to get a firm hold of the concept of risk 
and to rationally categorize cases appropriately. This is even more difficult 
under those regimes which hold that the abnormality of the danger is as-
sessed having regard to both the seriousness and the likelihood of the 
damage. This means that the same category comprises both minor acci-
dents with a high frequency and catastrophic accidents with low fre-
quency.23 Such blending of [129] two extremes is to be found in the PETL, 
the Austrian, Swiss and Turkish Draft and the American Rest. 3d.24  
 
Blending frequent and extraordinary events into one liability puts the catas-
trophic explosion of a munitions factory on par with a traffic accident, but 
the nature of such accidents differs considerably. From a societal point of 
view, they are incomparable: The causative mechanisms are distinct, the 
mass exposure is dissimilar, the consequences are totally different and the 
insurability is incomparable. Therefore, I find it unhelpful to think of these 
two extremes as belonging to the same category.25 That is, unless one 
feels that the foundation of liability of both extremes is similar. Perhaps traf-
fic accidents and munitions factory explosions are both „residual losses‟ 
(compare category 2) and therefore the cost of acceptable risks. If that is 
the case, however, we should ask ourselves whether the mere concept of 
„risk‟ has sufficient clarity to enable courts to decide which risks fit into this 
category.26  
 
5. Can activities as such be dangerous?  
 
Danger is a multiple headed monster. In the Netherlands, some years ago 
some 28 people died as a consequence of a simple omission by a profes-
sional seller of bubble baths. He had his products on display at an exhibi-
                                               
 
23
 Cf. European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law - Text and Commen-
tary (Wien 2005) 106. Note that the French Avant projet Catala does not blend these two 
opposites into one liability: art. 1362 concentrates on « activités très risquées », catastrophic 
accidents affecting large numbers of persons (“affecter un grand nombre de personnes”). 
24
 Art. 5:101 PETL; ALI, Restatement of the Law - Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1) (Philidelphia 2005) 286-287 (Comment g). Art. 50 Swiss Draft; art. 
70 Turkish Draft; art. 1302 (3) Austrian Draft. 
25
 In a similar vein, Erdem Büyüksagis, 'Die Haftung aus unerlaubter Handlung im Entwurf 
eines neuen türkischen Obligationenrechts', Haftung und Versicherung (HAVE) 2006, 333; 
Erdem Büyüksagis, 'De l'opportunité de préciser la portée d'une éventuelle clause générale 
de responsabilité pour risque', Haftung und Versicherung (HAVE) 2006,  5 ; R. Reischauer, 
'Reform des Schadenersatzrechts?' Österreiches Juristen Zeitung 2006, 398. Cf. G. 
Schamps, La Mise en Danger: un Concept Fondateur d'un Principe Général de Responsabi-
lité (Bruxelles 1998) 848-849; P. Cane, Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law 
(London 1999) 87-88. Contra: P. Apathy, 'Schadenersatzreform - Gefährdungshaftung und 
Unternehmerhaftung', Juristische Blätter 2007, 209.  
26
 See the critics referred to by G. Schamps, La Mise en Danger: un Concept Fondateur 
d'un Principe Général de Responsabilité (Bruxelles 1998) 847-848, p. 854 ff. 
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tion which was visited by some 80.000 persons. He omitted, however, to 
add chloride to the water that he used in the baths on display and he thus 
unknowingly created Legionnaire‟s disease in the bath, with fatal conse-
quences for some 28 visitors.27  
[130] In hindsight, we can say that the omission in the given circumstances 
was very dangerous indeed, but as such, the simple fact of not chlorinating 
the bath water in itself renders neither the water nor the bath dangerous. 
Only when you leave the water bubbling at a certain temperature, for a cer-
tain period of time and by exposing a certain population will the legionella 
bacteria develop and will the casualty number take on considerable propor-
tions. So, it is the accumulation of activities and inactivity on the side of the 
salesman that causes the danger and its materialization.  
Under the Austrian proposal, could the salesman be held liable under either 
§ 1302 or § 1303 for a „Tätigkeit‟ resulting in „hoher or erhöhter Gefahr‟, un-
der § 1304 for organisational failure, or merely under § 1295 for negligently 
creating this danger? Can we really decide whether a „Tätigkeit‟ is danger-
ous „als solche‟ without looking at the context of the damaging event? 
Similar questions can be raised under the other legislative initiatives. It all 
depends on what we define as the relevant activity: the mere display of the 
bath or the sequence of events and omissions that actually happened in 
connection with this activity.  
 
My main argument here is that the more careful legislative approach would 
be to have strict liabilities attached to objects rather than activities.28 Natu-
rally, courts will always run into borderline cases when using for instance 
„dangerous substance‟ as a defining concept for strict liability, but at least 
then you recognize a borderline case when you see it. My fear is that the 
concept of „dangerous activities‟ is too vague and may one day turn out to 
include activities such as providing French fries to overweight persons. 
Moreover, trying to distinguish between different levels of danger, as the 
Austrian proposal does, really proves to be very difficult.  
In essence, the price of using vague concepts („general clauses‟) is always 
paid in the form of a lower level of predictability. It is really a matter of more 
or less vagueness. I would prefer a legislative attempt at categorizing risks 
over a „general clause‟ which endorse courts with the grave duty of catego-
rizing.29  
                                               
 
27
 On this Dutch case see, e.g., W.J. Hengeveld, 'De afwikkeling van 'voorbije' rampen', 
AV&S 2007, 237-239. 
28
 Cf. Erdem Büyüksagis, 'De l'opportunité de préciser la portée d'une éventuelle clause 
générale de responsabilité pour risque', Haftung und Versicherung (HAVE) 2006, 4-5.  
29
 Contra: Pierre Widmer, 'Reform und Vereinheitlichung des Haftpflichtrechts auf Schweize-
rischer und europäischer Ebene', in: Reinhard Zimmermann (ed.), Grundstrukturen des Eu-
ropäischen Deliktsrechts (Baden-Baden 2003) 174-175. Note that the Swiss Draft uses both 
techniques: specific statutory provisions for certain sources of increased danger and a „gen-
eral clause‟ in art. 50 OR. Cf. G. Schamps, La Mise en Danger: un Concept Fondateur d'un 
Principe Général de Responsabilité (Bruxelles 1998) 850-851. See also Franz Werro, 'The 
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[131] At the end of the day, the vaguest of liabilities, fault-based liability for 
wrongful omission, will always be able to help out: in the Dutch case, the 
salesman was held to an objective and normative standard of conduct of a 
well-informed and reasonable bubble bath salesman. He failed this norma-
tive standard and was therefore at fault according to the objective fault re-
quirement under Dutch law.  
 
6. Is tort law addressing the right risks? 
 
Do bubble baths inherently pose the risk of spreading Legionnaire's dis-
ease? This appears to be a silly question: it is not the object as such but 
the negligent behaviour of the operator in „operating the bath‟ that causes 
the risk. But if that is the case, why then is a motor vehicle considered to be 
a source of inherent danger? Is this because accident statistics show that 
traffic is a major source of fatality? This may be a correct answer, but it is 
also a dangerous answer. If tort law derives its risk categorization from sta-
tistics, we may soon discover that tort law is in fact addressing the wrong 
risks by focusing on the „exotic accident‟ in which causation is easy to 
prove and which proves to be statistically insignificant of accidents. 
 
Table 1 gives us some indication of sources of health risk (number of qual-
ity adjusted life years affected by a number of risks). Another way of looking 
at this is by measuring the total cost of health care in a given country and 
carving out the cost of accidents (which may serve as a crude proxy for 
measuring cases in which tort law could possibly play a role). According to 
this method, the cost of accidents seems to be negligible: some 3 % of 
Dutch health care cost relate to accidents.30 Although not decisive evi-
dence, these data may signal that tort law is not fully committed to the risks 
that society faces. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
Swiss Tort Reform: a Possible Model for Europe?' in: Mauro Bussani (ed.), European Tort 
Law - Eastern and Western Perspectives (Berne 2007) 90 en 97, who expresses doubts as 
to whether courts are indeed capable to build a consistent framework for evaluating risks. 
30
 Cf. L.C.J. Slobbe e. a., Kosten van Ziekten in Nederland 2003, Bilthoven: RIVM 2006 
(www.kostenvanziekten.nl).  
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Tabel 1 (source: A.E.M. de Hollander and A.H. Hanemaaijer, Nuchter omgaan 
met risico's (RIVM Rapport 251701047) (2003) ) 
 
 
 
Whatever quantitative approach one would take to tort law, obviously these 
data are merely illustrative rather than decisive.31 The general point I would 
like to make here is that if we use statistics to justify tort policy choices – 
e.g., to consider bubble baths as a source of liability for legionnaire's dis-
ease – then we may face the difficult task of explaining why other, statisti-
cally more significant sources of danger, are not subject to some form of 
liability. 
 
Moreover, inherent risks are manifold. Knives cut, guns kill, staircases and 
windows make people fall, passive smoking causes lung cancer, selling 
alcohol causes accidents and (domestic) violence. Naturally, the chain of 
cause and effect [132] are long stretched in all of these cases, and intermit-
tent behaviour of others (possibly the victim himself) is involved, but from a 
statistical point of view these cases are not different from the risks of, e.g., 
motor vehicles. Note that I am not advocating inclusion or exclusion of 
these cases in a (strict) liability for dangerous activities. I am merely point-
ing out that even in tort law policy, rationality demands risk categorization 
according to an objective benchmark – which may be any objective data 
such as on the number of lives at stake, the impact on society or the seri-
                                               
 
31
 Moreover, such tables are time-limited in the sense that the calculations may vary with 
changing scientific and political insights in the true extent of certain risks. On that subject, 
see, e.g., R. Pieterman, 'The Social Construction of Fat: Care and Control in the Public Con-
cern for Healthy Behaviour', 2 Sociology Compass 2008, 309 ff.  
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ousness of the injuries sustained. Such an objective method seems to be 
lacking. Obviously, tort law in the classical sense cannot properly address 
modern society‟s diffuse risks, such as health impairment caused by diffuse 
causative mechanisms.32 It can do so only if there is some form of propor-
tional liability in cases of uncertain causation. Resolving this issue is vital to 
Europe‟s future tort law. [133] 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
This paper has merely scratched the surface of a complex set of issues re-
lating to the functions of tort law in distinguishing acceptable from unac-
ceptable risks. Often, such risks are brought about by deliberate organisa-
tional design choice. Legislature and courts are called upon to assess 
which of these design choices are acceptable and which are not. 
By evaluating a number of recent legislative drafts and proposals I have 
presented an outline of what seems to be becoming a standard of „organ-
isational liability‟ for organisational failure. Moreover, I have put forward a 
threefold typology of risks in tort law which seems to go a long way in cate-
gorizing tort law cases involving organisational design risks. Finally, I have 
called the reader‟s attention to the fact that tort law is in need of rational 
recalibration with regard to the „ranking of risks‟, as it seems that some 
risks are inconsistently categorized as either acceptable or unacceptable. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
32
 On this issue, e.g., William L. Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, 'Causation in Tort: General 
Populations vs. Individual Cases', John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper no. 360 
2007, 1 ff. See also W.H. van Boom, Efficacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort (inaugur-
al lecture EUR) (The Hague 2006) 20 ff. 
